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Negligent conduct results from a failure of one to conform to a re-
quired standard of care.' Ordinarily the standard of care demanded is
measured by the conduct of the so-called "reasonable man" under the same
or similar circumstances. The law assumes basic characteristics attributable
to the reasonable man. He is a man of prudence-he looks before pro-
ceeding; he thinks before acting. He is a man endowed with certain mini-
mum knowledge gained from his experience, and he must act accordingly.
If he has gained knowledge through education, he is thereafter required
to utilize this knowledge for his own safety and the safety of others. 2
STANDARD OF CARE FOR THE PHYSICIAN
What is the standard of conduct required of a physician? To some
extent, it is the same standard that is used to judge the conduct of a defen-
dant in an ordinary negligence action. The physician has gained skill and
knowledge superior to that of the ordinary man, and the law will demand
that he conform his conduct in a manner consistent with this higher knowl-
edge and skill.
The Illinois courts, in instructing the jury as to the standard required
of a physician, rely on the following:
In [treating] [operating upon] a patient, a doctor must possess
and apply the knowledge and use the skill and care that is ordi-
narily used by reasonably well-qualified doctors in the locality in
which he practices or in similar localities in similar cases and
circumstances.3
Some explanation is needed to better understand this instruction.
The standard established for the medical profession does not necessi-
tate that the highest degree of skill be exercised nor, on the other hand,
that an average degree of skill be exercised. This proposition was first
established in Holtzman v. Hoy.4 In that case, the patient alleged that the
physician was negligent in his treatment of the patient's fractured leg, In
affirming for the physician, the court explained that the highest degree of
care would eliminate all but the best of physicians, while an average degree
of care would include the "quacks, the yp.ng men who have no practice,
the old ones who have dropped out of practice ... " which would place
the standard too low. 5 Thus, the law excludes those no longer practicing
I Prosser, Torts § 30 (3d ed. 1964).
2 Id. § 32.
3 I.P.J. § 105.01 (1961).
4 118 Ill. 534, 8 N.E. 832 (1886).
5 Id. at 536, 8 N.E. at 832 [repeated in Olander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App. 89, 95
(2d Dist. 1930)].
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medicine and those unfit to practice medicine when determining the
standard. Instead the law assumes that the standard will be based only on
those in good professional standing "and of these [physicians] it is not the
middle but the minimum common skill which is to be looked at."6
The standard of care that must be exercised by the one who holds
himself out as a physician or as a surgeon and, as such, attempts to treat
another, is the same as if the person were a physician or a surgeon. For
example, in Williams v. Piontkowski,7 the defendant was licensed as a
chiropractor but held himself out as being able to practice obstetrics. The
court said the would-be doctor in such circumstances must bear the same
responsibility as a licensed medical practitioner. When the patient believes
the person treating him to be a physician, he must be chargeable as a
physician. Likewise in Matthei v. Wooley,8 where a druggist, holding
himself out as a doctor, undertook to cure the plaintiff's finger, the court
held him liable, imposing the same standards upon him as if he were a
doctor.9
STANDARD OF CARE FOR THE SPECIALIST
What is the standard of care for the specialist in the profession of
medicine? The Illinois Supreme Court's Committee for adoption of Jury
Instructions has formalized the following instruction as to the skill that
must be exercised by a specialist:
In [treating] [operating upon] a patient, a doctor who holds
himself out as a specialist and undertakes service in a particular
branch of medical, surgical, or other healing science, must possess
and apply the knowledge and use the skill and care which reason-
ably well-qualified specialists in the same field, practicing in the
same locality, or in similar localities, ordinarily would use in
similar cases and circumstances.10
Although this instruction has been adopted by the Committee, its validity
as law has not been fully established in Illinois. In Schireson v. Walsh,"1
6 Prosser, Torts § 32 (3d ed. 1964). William J. Curran, in his article "Professional
Negligence-Some General Comments" in Professional Negligence (Roady and Anderson,
1960), questions the "minimum common skill" standard which the physician is required
to attain. He argues that in ordinary negligence cases the defendant must conduct himself
as the "reasonable man" would in the same or similar circumstances. This requires prudent
conduct-prudent conduct being higher than merely average conduct. However, with
regard to the professional man, he argues that "we seem to be satisfied with average or
minimum acceptable conduct."
7 337 Ill. App. 101, 84 N.E.2d 843 (3d Dist. 1949) (Abst.).
8 69 Ill. App. 654 (1st Dist. 1897). Accord, Prout v. G. Gordon Martin, Inc., 160 Ill.
App. 11 (1st Dist. 1911); (unprofessional treatment by defendant, a corporation practicing
dentistry).
9 It should be noted that a person who does not profess to be a doctor but merely
gives gratuitous advice on a remedy for an injury or a disease will not be held to the
same standard of a physician. McNevins v. Lowe, 40 Il. 209 (1866).
10 I.P.I. § 105.02 (1961).
11 354 II. 40, 187 N.E. 921 (1933).
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the only case in Illinois discussing the question of the standard of care to
be exercised by a specialist, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated as dictum
that the standard to be followed was contra to the above-quoted instruction.
In the Schireson case, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the De-
partment of Registration and Education had applied an incorrect rule of
law in revoking the license of the plaintiff-doctor on grounds of gross mal-
practice. The Department argued that ". . . when a physician ... proclaims
himself one of the greatest and most skillful plastic surgeons in the world,
. . . the law demands a much higher degree of skill and ability than is
expected of the average physician."' 2 The court, however, said,
Under this proposition of law ... specialists in treating a pa-
tient professionally might do or omit to do some act the doing or
omission of which would constitute malpractice or gross malprac-
tice on his part which would not even be deemed negligence on
the part of the average, ordinary physician or surgeon in the same
community. Under the rule adopted by the commission ... the de-
gree of professional skill required on the part of a physician . . .
might be made to depend upon the extravagance or boastfulness
of his statements as to his skill and ability as a physician or sur-
geon. We do not believe it can be seriously contended that such is
the law of this State. 13
Although the Illinois court would not accept the Department's analysis of
the law, it appears that the Department was in accord with the majority of
decisions discussing standard of care for a specialist. 14 The Committee
drafting the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions in refusing to follow the
dictum in the Schireson case assumed that Illinois law would follow the
majority rule and thus drafted the instruction accordingly.
THE SAME OR SIMILAR LOCALITY PROVISION
Both the instructions denoting standard of care for the physician and
standard of care that must be exercised by the specialist mention "practice
in locality or in similar localities."'15 Earlier medical malpractice cases did
not limit the standard of care to the same locality. Instead the standard was
the skill exercised by the "profession"16-a much wider standard. Not
until Bacon v. Walsh'7 did Illinois courts set the rule as to how broad the
physician's knowledge on particular medical skills and practices would
12 Id. at 56, 187 N.E. at 927.
13 Id. at 56-57, 187 N.E. at 927.
14 See McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Carbone v.
Warburton, 22 N.J. Super. 5, 91 A.2d 518 (1952), aff'd, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953);
Malila v. Meacham, 187 Or. 330, 211 P.2d 747 (1949).
15 Supra notes 4 and 7.
16 Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 385 (1860).
17 184 Ill. App. 377 (3d Dist. 1913). It should be noted in that case that the jury was
instructed on care and skill that must be exercised by the defendant in terms of the school
to which the defendant belongs. This is a different concept entirely from the "same or
similar locality" provision which the Illinois Supreme Court in that case finally estab-
lished. For a detailed analysis on this subject, see 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 44
(1951) and p. 114 of this symposium.
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have to be. In that case, the court narrowed the standard to encompass only
"that degree of professional knowledge, skill and care which the average
physician anid surgeon in good practice would ordinarily bring to a similar
case under like circumstances in that locality."' 8
It has been argued that the locality provision imposes too low a re-
quirement upon physicians and surgeons. One student author suggests that
the "locality rule should not be a shield used to protect a physician who,
perhaps because of a self-imposed isolation, has blinded himself to the
progress of his profession and thus established for himself a defense to a
malpractice action."' 9 Indeed, Dean Prosser has recognized that an in-
creasing number of jurisdictions have abandoned the formula of "locality
or similar locality," thus recognizing that medical standards are ap-
proaching a nation-wide uniformity.2o The Committee that drafted the
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions contends that the locality rule in Illinois
today merely will be applied where the physician of a small community is
faced with an emergency situation.21 That physician will be relieved from
the use of appliances and treatment used by the physician in the larger
community.
PROOF OF A BAD RESULT
Proof by the patient that the treatment given by the physician was
not favorable-that he still suffers from the same condition or illness-
does not of itself indicate that the physician failed to use the acceptable
standard of conduct. Similarly, proof that the physician had made a mere
error in judgment on the best method of treatment of itself will not indi-
cate the physician failed to use the acceptable standard of conduct. In
Scardina v. Colletti,22 it was alleged by the administrator of the decedent's
estate that the surgeon negligently failed to ligate a severed blood vessel,
which resulted in profuse internal bleeding, requiring further operation.
There was testimony in behalf of the defendant by another surgeon who
reported that it was possible that the ligature may have slipped off, but
that this was one of the normal risks of surgery. The court, in holding for
the defendant, stated that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof
as he failed to show that the defendant was unskillful or negligent. "It is
not enough to prove that he made a mistake or that this treatment harmed
plaintiff."23 The court went on to say that "proof of a bad result or mishap
is no evidence of lack of skill or negligence." 24
is Id. at 379.
19 See 14 DePaul L.R. 453, 456 (1965).
20 For an examination of some of the jurisdictions that have abandoned the locality
fprmula, see Prosser, Torts § 32 at 167, n.43, (3d ed. 1964):
21 I.P.I. § 105.01 (1961). See Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 772 (1949).
22 63 Ill App. 2d 481, 211 N.E.2d 762 (1st Dist. 1965).
23 Id. at 488, 211 N.E.2d at 765.
24 Ibid.
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Simfiilarly, in Quinn v. Donovan,25 the court declared:
If appellant possessed, and in the treatment of appellee's arm
used, reasonable skill, he could not be held r~sponsible, although
the result of the treatment Was not as favorable as appellee ex-
pected or might of anticipated .... A. physician, cannot be regarded
as an insurer of a successful result of all cases.
2 6
In Sims v. Parker,27 the court held-
No man, skilled or unskilled, undertakes that he shall be suc-
cessful; he undertakes for good faith and integrity but not for in-
fallibility and he is liable for negligent bad faith or dishonesty
but not lapses consequent upon mere errors of judgment.28
The physician in the Sims case prescribed treatment for a hernia where, in
fact, no hernia existed. The treatment necessitated the plaintiff to wear a
truss, which caused an abscess at the point where the bulb of the truss
pressed. The mere proof that the physician was mistaken as to the existence
of the rupture or proof that the abscess was caused by the pressure of the
truss Was riot enough to entitle plaintiff to a verdict, for the plaintiff
failed to show that the defendant had not followed a standard of conduct
which other physicians in the locality would have used in the same or
similar circumstances.
The physician also will not be liable if he uses a different method of
treatment than other doctors in the comniunity, if the method he uses is
a recognized one for that specific malady or injury. In Wade v. Ravenswood
Hosp. Ass'n,29 the plaintiff charged inter alia, that the examining physician
failed to take X-rays or spinal punctures and failed to provide prompt im-
mobilization and traction subsequent to a diagnosis 6f a cervical fracture
and cord injury. Plaintiff Was moved to Hines Hospital two days later,
where these procedures were followed. The physician testified that no X-
rays were taken for fear of moving the patient. The court said that the phy-
sician was not negligent for selecting one of the different methods of treat-
ment, even though it later developed that his choice Was not the best.
Thus, the proof of a bad result, mishap or mistake in judgient of
treatment is not of itself proof of negligence. However;, such proof may be
considered by the jury along with all other evidence, and thus may lead to
an inference of negligence. In Doyle v. Owens,30 the defendant physician
had been negligent. However, there Was subsequently a failure by the plainz
tiff to follow the defendant's direction for treatment of the injury. The
combination of defendant's Wrong and plaintiff'S wrong caused ihe bad
25 85 Il. 194 (1877).
26 Id. at 195.
27 41 Ill. App. 284 (1st Dist. 1891).
28 Id. at 286.
29 3 Ill. App. 2d 102, 120 N.E.2d 345 (1st Dist. 19 4).
80 150 Ill. App. 415, 417 (2d Dist. 1909).
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result. The court held that it was incorrect to instruct the jury that they
should not take into consideration the evidence of a bad result.
The reason that the physician is not liable merely because of bad re-
suits is that malpractice liability rests ordinarily on the theory of tort and
as such no warranties, either expressed or implied, exist. Although the re-
lationship between the parties would allow the patient to sue the physician
in an action sounding in either tort or contract, there have been no cases in
Illinois that have held that a doctor may be held liable for an agreement
made by the doctor with the patient that an operation would cure the con-
dition which the plaintiff was suffering.3 ' As was stated in Gault v. Sideman,
"The application of the ordinary rules dealing with mercantile contracts
to a contract entered into between a physician and a patient in our opinion
is not justified."32
It can be argued that for public policy reasons the courts fear imposing
contract liability upon doctors. The courts realize that medicine is not an
exact science and that the doctor knows he cannot warrant his treatment.
The courts also wish to protect the physician from the claims of the
fraudulent minded.33
SPECIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE
STANDARD OF CONDUCT
What duty is imposed upon the physician who may have lesser knowl-
edge in certain areas of medicine or lack the facilities to adequately treat
the patient? Will he fall below the required standard of care for use of
the skills and facilities he has without referring the patient to a specialist
in the field? The Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction on the duty of the phy-
sician to refer a patient to a specialist is as follows:
If in the treatment of a patient, a doctor realizes, or if, in the
exercise of that care and skill which a reasonably well-qualified
doctor would ordinarily use in the locality in which he practices,
or in similar localities, should realize that the nature of the pa-
tient's illness [condition] requires services of a [physician] [surgeon]
[dentist] skilled in a special branch of [medical] [surgical] [dental]
science, then the [doctorl [dentist] is under a duty to [advise the
patient to consult a specialist] [refer the patient to a specialist]. 34
There have been no Illinois cases on the duty of a physician to refer
a patient to a specialist. The Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction is based on
a New York case, Benson v. Dean,33 where a physician was found negligent
by his failure to refer his patient to a rectal specialist to remove a needle
31 Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 107, 191 N.E.2d 436, 442 (1st Dist. 1963).
32 Id. at 109, 191 N.E.2d at 443.
33 See Zostautas v. St. Anthony DePadua Hosp., 23 111. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961);
Miller, Contractual Liability of Physician and Surgeon, Wash U.L.Q. 413 (1953).
34 I.P.J. § 105.03 (1961). Last bracketed phrase used if patient is incapacitated to act.
35 232 N.Y. 52, 133 N.E. 125 (1921).
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which the defendant physician had left in a wound. Thus, the Illinois law
would seem to be that there is a duty to advise the patient to see one who
is more qualified in the profession, when the physician's knowledge of, or
facilities for treatment are inadequate.
The courts have not answered the question whether or not it is the
duty of the physician to keep informed of new drugs, treatment and tech-
niques commonly used in the profession. It is true that there is "no obliga-
tion to use drugs or procedures which at the time of treatment were still
in the experimental stage, and in fact such novel treatment might lay the
groundwork for a valid malpractice suit." 36 However, it may be that in the
future it will be the physician's duty to keep abreast of the medical ad-
vances and if the physician fails to do so and the patient suffers, then the
physician will not have come up to the standard of conduct required and
liability will be fixed. 37
With medical science moving so rapidly, is not each patient entitled
to the benefits of these advances? In turn, does not each physician have a
duty to see to it that his patient is treated in a manner consistent with ad-
vancing medicine? The lawyer would be negligent by relying in his brief
on an overruled case. The doctor should be held liable for use of an out-
moded medicine or procedure when information on the newer medicine or
procedure is as close as the recent medical digests.
In maintaining the standard of conduct required, is it necessary for
the physician to warn the patient of the possible dangerous consequences of
treatment? In Hall v. United States,88 the plaintiff entered Great Lakes
Naval Training Center Hospital to receive prenatal care. Subsequent to her
child's birth, she was given a spinal anesthetic. The plaintiff, thereafter,
had no control of her legs, lower back, bladder or bowels. She alleged inter
alia, that the anesthetic was improperly administered and charged that the
defendant's agents failed to inform and warn her in advance of the pos-
sibility of disastrous results. There was testimony on behalf of the defen-
dant that most patients are in a state of high nervous tension and anxiety
when preparing for delivery, and it would be a bad practice to warn them
that they might die or become paralyzed as a result of receiving anesthetics.
The court, in applying Illinois law, agreed with the testifying physicians
that there was no duty to warn of possible consequences of a specific regu-
larly practiced medical procedure, unless the patient requested such infor-
mation beforehand.
The court in the Hall case may have reached its decision because of the
nature of psychological stress on an expectant mother. However, the same
86 Murphy, Medical Malpractice, 7 Defense L.J. 3, 12 (1960). See also Julien v. Barker,
75 Idaho 413, 272 P.2d 718 (1954), Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154
Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957).
37 Murphy, Medical Malpractice, 7 Defense L.J. 3, 12 (1960).
88 136 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. La. 1955).
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decision may not be reached in all cases. There may be a duty to inform
the patient of the consequences of a particular procedure if alternative
procedures are possible, thus allowing the patient to make a choice.39
There may also be a duty to inform the patient if the consequences of the
proposed procedure to be used are substantially certain to occur. 40 Hence,
the duty upon the physician to inform is conditioned on the type of treat-
ment which is necessary, the danger of that treatment and the psychological
stability of the patient.
GERALD J. SMOLLER
SPECIALISTS
The standard of care, in most jurisdictions, has been modified to re-
quire a greater degree of skill from specialists than ordinary general prac-
titioners.1 The rationale for imposing this greater duty is that specialists
are sought out and greater confidence is placed in them by patients because
of the expertise they profess.2
Illinois courts, however, have not changed the ordinary standard of
care3 in dealing with specialists. In Schierson v. Walsh,4 the defendant-phy-
sician had claimed to be one of the greatest and most skillful surgeons in
the world. The plaintiff, through the State Department of Registration and
Education, sought to have the defendant's license revoked. The medical
committee of the Department held the defendant to his assertions of ex-
pertise. Thus, his acts of negligence became gross neglect because of the
higher standard of care that was imposed on him. This showing of gross
malpractice met statutory requirements for license revocation.5
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the defendant's
license. The court, in holding that an imposition of a higher standard of
care on the defendant was improper, stated that the test of "reasonable
skill.., such as physicians in good practice ordinarily use and would bring
to a similar case in that locality" was "... safe for both public and
profession."6
39 Cf., Bang v. Charles T Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
40 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317
P.2d 170 (1957).
1 See, e.g., Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953); Rayburn v. Day,
126 Or. 135, 286 Pac. 1002 (1928).
2 Baker v. Hancock, 29 Ind. App. 456, 63 N.E. 323 (1902).
3 Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 385 (1860).
4 354 Ill. 40, 187 N.E. 921 (1933).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 16a(3), Medical Practice Act (1959 as amended 1961, 1963, and
1965).
The section provides that license revocation can be based on a showing of gross
malpractice or gross negligence. Ordinary negligence, sufficient to establish a prima fade
case of malpractice, would not be adequate.
6 Supra note 4, at 49, 187 N.E. at 927 (1933).
